This paper studies optimal real-time monetary policy when the central bank takes the exogenous volatility of the output gap and inflation as proxy of the undistinguishable uncertainty on the exogenous disturbances and the parameters of its model. The paper shows that when the exogenous volatility surrounding a specific state variable increases, the optimal policy response to that variable should increase too, while the optimal response to the remaining state variables should attenuate or be unaffected. In this way the central bank moves preemptively to reduce the risk of large deviations of the economy from the steady state that would deteriorate the distribution forecasts of the output gap and inflation. When an empirical test is carried out on the U.S. economy the model predictions tend to be consistent with the data. * We are grateful to Martin Ellison and Michael Woodford for valuable discussions. We also thank
Introduction
A pervasive feature of monetary policymaking is the uncertainty about the state of the economy, the economy's structure and the inferences that the public will draw from policy actions or economic developments (Bernanke 2007) . Policymakers have long recognized that coping with these forms of uncertainty poses complicated issues in real-time monetary decisions. Uncertainty on the output gap, for example, corresponds to uncertainty on where the economy is located with respect to the business cycle. Thus real-time decisions, which are necessarily based on output gap estimates, can turn out to be wrong from an ex-post perspective. This problem is well documented by Orphanides and van Norden (2002) who show that the reliability of the output gap measure is quite low. Uncertainty on the structure of the economy is another key cause of policy errors. This uncertainty stems from the limited knowledge of the critical forces that govern the economic system at any point in time. Clearly, the more these forces are missed in modeling the economy, the larger the policy errors. The problem raised by the uncertainty on the state and structure of the economy is further aggravated by the di¢ culty to relate observable changes in the volatility of key state variables -a s in ‡ation and output gapto these sources of uncertainty. As noted by Bernanke (2007) , "Apart from issues of measurement, policymakers face enormous challenges in determining the sources of variation in the data."
This paper studies optimal monetary policy under three fairly realistic assumptions. The …r s t is that in real-time policymakers do not know with certainty the exogenous disturbances to the economy and the parameters of their model. Furthermore, they are unable to distinguish the impact of these sources of uncertainty on the in ‡ation and output gap processes. Under these assumptions some natural questions arise. Given the importance that modern monetary policy attributes to the distribution forecast of in ‡ation and output gap for policy actions, should the di¢ culty to tell in real-time the impact of the various sources of uncertainty on these variables be considered by policymakers? And to what extent, if any, and how perceived changes in the level of undistinguishable uncertainty should be considered? Given the current economic conditions, these are timely questions. The US, for instance, witnessed average real-time output gap volatility rising from 2.1% per annum over the 1997-2006 period to 2.6% per annum afterwards, and average GDP price in‡a t i o n volatility rising from 0.3% per annum in 1997-2006 to 0.5% per annum afterwards.
To address these questions, we introduce a …n a l assumption. We let policymakers use their judgment to form an opinion on the level of exogenous volatility surrounding the demand and supply side of the economy, which can be interpreted as the perceived level of exogenous volatility for the in ‡ation and output gap processes. Then, policymakers take this volatility as a proxy for the level of undistinguishable uncertainty in the exogenous disturbances and the model parameters.
These assumptions get re ‡ected in a stylized two-step representation of the central bank decision process. First, central banks estimate at a certain time frequency the state and model of the economy being aware that the estimates are surrounded by uncertainty. Second, at a higher frequency, policymakers assess the amount of uncertainty of the estimates using as proxies of the undistinguishable uncertainty the exogenous volatility of the in ‡ation and output gap processes and take better-informed policy decisions.
Methodologically, the analysis is performed by introducing a NewKeynesian model that conveniently accounts for undistinguishable uncertainty in the state and structure of the economy. We then estimate the model and use the Markov Jump-Linear-Quadratic approach developed by Svensson and Williams (2007) to study how optimal monetary policy responds to changes in the exogenous output gap and in ‡ation volatilities as proxies of uncertainty about the state and structure of the economy. Finally, we test the theoretical results on US data.
Previous literature has studied optimal monetary policy in presence of multiplicative uncertainty. The initial idea that model uncertainty requires some cautiousness in policy decisions, as suggested by the Brainard's (1967) seminal contribution, has been revised by Söderström (2002) who …r s t shows, in a backward-looking model, that in presence of uncertainty on the in ‡ation persistence monetary policy should be more aggressive. Kimura and Kurozumi (2007) extend the analysis to a New-Keynesian model with a hybrid Phillips curve and where the uncertainty on the in ‡ation persistence makes also uncertain the social welfare loss that the central bank wants to minimize. The results of Kimura and Kurozumi are in line with Söderström's work and both papers mark an important deviation from the conventional wisdom originated by Brainard's article and corroborated by the subsequent literature 1 . Our contribution, with respect to this line of research, lies in studying optimal monetary policy when the central bank considers the undistinguishable uncertainty on the model parameters and the exogenous disturbances proxied by the perceived level of uncertainty surrounding the demand and supply sides of the economy. Within a Markov jump linear quadratic framework, this paper shows that when the exogenous volatility surrounding a state variable increases, the optimal policy response to that variable should increase too, while the optimal response to the remaining state variables should attenuate or be una¤ected. Empirically, when a test is carried out on the US economy the model predictions tend to be consistent with the data. This result matters for policy in that when policymakers have real-time limited information on the sources of uncertainty, nonetheless perceive shifts in the relative volatility of in ‡ation and output gap, they may exploit this information to …n e -t u n e the policy response to the state variables.
The remaining of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 introduces the theoretical model. In section 3 we estimate the aggregate demand and supply, (henceforth AD and AS) using US data. In section 4 we use the estimates of the AD and AS along with a standard calibration for the central bank preferences to …n d the optimal monetary policy when central bank decisions consider the volatility level on the in ‡ation and output gap process. Our theoretical predictions are then tested on US monetary policy data. Section 5 provides some robustness analysis and Section 6 summarizes our …n d i n g s and o¤ers some conclusions.
Theoretical model
The behavior of the private sector is captured by a New-Keynesian model with realistic monetary policy transmission lags and inertia in the behavior of households and …r m s . The model is derived from microfoundations 2 and is similar in spirit to Boivin and Giannoni (2006) and Flamini (2007) . Speci…cally, while it shares with both a special attention in describing accurately the dynamics of the private sector, it mainly di¤ers from the former in considering optimal monetary policy instead of a forward-looking Taylor rule and from the latter in focusing on a closed economy rather than an open economy. Furthermore, the current model …n d s the optimal monetary policy in presence of multiplicative uncertainty following the Markov-jump linear quadratic approach developed by Svensson and Williams (2007) . The AD and AS are respectively described by the following relations
where for any variable x the expression x t+ jt denotes the rational expectation of x in period t + conditional on the information available in period t; all the variables are in terms of log deviations from constant steady state values, y t ; r t ; t denote output gap, real short term interest rate, and in ‡ation rate, respectively, with r t i t t+1jt and i t denoting the short term nominal interest rate, and …n a l l y, " y and " are exogenous disturbances allowing the economy to depart from the steady state.
The presence of the factors y t and t is an innovation with respect to the previous literature. y t and t are random variables capturing the uncertainty on the state and structure of the economy assuming that in real-time it is impossible for the central bank to distinguish the impact of these sources of uncertainty on the volatility of the output gap and in ‡ation processes. This assumption is motivated by the fact that in real-time policymakers face di¢ -culties in observing speci…c disturbances hitting the economy and have limited knowledge on their properties too. Furthermore, the true model of the economy is not known with certainty so that even if there were full knowledge of the disturbances, di¢ culties would arise in nowcasting and forecasting their impact on the economy.
To model the assumption of undistinguishable uncertainties, we let y t and t have a symmetric distribution, expected value equal to one and variance proportional to the exogenous volatility of the in ‡ation and output gap processes as we will discuss below. At any point in time, a value of the factors di¤erent from one can capture uncertainty on the stochastic properties of the exogenous disturbances hitting the economy and/or uncertainty in the central bank estimates of the model parameters. Regarding the former, an example can be a preference or a technology shock which occurred in the previous period and that turns out to be more persistent than expected. On the other hand, uncertainty in the estimates of the model parameters can be caused by their possible time varying nature which is missed by the policymakers 3 . In this case, y t and t record general model uncertainty, that is, uncertainty that stems from the structure of the model and that is impossible to attribute to speci…c parameters in real-time.
While the coe¢ cients of the AS and AD can be estimated at a …x e d frequency, the information ‡o w accessible to central bank and relevant for policy decisions is continuous and sometimes not apt for a direct use in the estimation process. Nevertheless, this information ‡o w can be useful for policymakers to form an opinion on the variance of y t and t . To model this idea we as-sume that policymakers use all the available information and their judgment to form an opinion on the exogenous volatility of the in ‡ation and output gap processes. Then, they consider this volatility as proxy for the variance of y t and t in the determination of the optimal monetary policy.
Within this framework, the central bank optimization problem consists of …n d i n g the interest rate path that maximizes its preferences subject to the AD and AS and to the opinion on the level of uncertainty proxied by the exogenous volatility of the in ‡ation and output gap processes. Turning to central bank preferences, they are described by the following standard loss function
where ; and are weights that express the preferences of the central bank for the in ‡ation and output gap stabilization targets, and the instrument smoothing target, respectively. Regarding the interest rate smoothing preference for a central bank that pursues in ‡ation targeting see, for example, Svensson (2010) , p. 2, Holmsen et al. (2008) , and Wo o dford (2003).
Optimal monetary policy with Non-certainty Equivalence
In our analysis we let the central bank consider undistinguishable uncertainty via multiplicative shocks. On the one hand, the use of a multiplicative rather than additive shock is consistent with the multiplicative nature of the uncertainty surrounding the structural parameters and the properties of the exogenous disturbances. On the other hand, it provides a convenient way of investigating optimal monetary policy in presence of uncertainty. It is well known, in fact, that the linear-quadratic setup features certainty equivalence, which implies that optimal monetary policy does not depend on additive uncertainty. Instead, considering y t and t as multiplicative shocks we can relax the certainty equivalence assumption and study how uncertainty a¤ects the optimal policy. Relaxing the certainty equivalence assumption is also important in that allows us to introduce a key realistic aspect of monetary policy, namely the policymakers'focus on the distribution forecasts of the target variables rather than the mean forecasts.
We follow this route by assuming a discrete support for y t and t and that in any period these shocks can take n j di¤erent values corresponding to n j exogenous modes drawn by nature and indexed by j t 2 f1; 2; :::; n j g : Thus y t and t correspond to y jt and jt , respectively. Then, the Markov Jump-Linear-Quadratic approach developed by Svensson and Williams (2007a) and further discussed in Svensson and Williams (2007b) is adopted to solve the central bank optimization problem in presence of multiplicative shocks 4 . Thus, we let the mode j t follow a Markov process with constant transition probabilities and start by assuming that each transition probabilities has the same value P jk Pr fj t+1 = kjj t = jg = 1 n j ; 8 j; k 2 f1; 2; :::; n j g :
Next, let P [P jk ] be the Markov transition matrix and p p 1t ; :::; p n j t 0 (with p jt Pr fj t = jg) the central bank's subjective probability distribution over the modes in period t: We now assume that the central bank does not observe the modes and that does not update its subjective distribution of modes through the observation of the economy 5 . Thus its subjective distribution p t p 1t ; :::; p n j t 0 evolves according to the exogenous transition probabilities, that is
As to the central bank knowledge before choosing the instrument i t at the beginning of period t; the information set consists of the transition matrix P; the central bank's subjective probability distribution over the modes in period t and subsequent periods via (5); the n j di¤erent values that each of the matrices can take in any mode and, …n a l l y, the realizations of X t . Given (4), the unique stationary distribution of the modes associated with the Markov transition matrix P is a uniform distribution. Thus the transition probabilities described by (4) capture the case of generalized modes uncertainty in which modes are serially i.i.d. The motivation to consider this case lies in the interest of studying optimal monetary policy when the central bank has a minimal knowledge on the multiplicative shocks, speci…cally it only knows their bands and considers any realization as equally likely. In section 5, to check for the robustness of the results, we explore an alternative assumption where the modes exhibit some persistence. We now assume that there are n j = 5 modes so that the stationary distribution for the shock with the parameter h allowing to change the variance of the distribution. Moreover, we assume that the multiplicative shocks and the additive exogenous disturbances to the economy are independent so that modes j t and innovations " t are independently distributed 6 . Summing up, the central bank cannot observe the modes yet …n d the optimal monetary policy
taking into account the volatility of the multiplicative shocks through its information set 7 .
Model estimation
To choose the coe¢ cients of the AD and AS equations (1) and (2) Hodrick-Presott (1997) trend, (iii) …n a l output detrended by the Congressional Budget O¢ ce (CBO) measure of potential GDP, and (iv) …n a l -t i m e output detrended by a Hodrick-Presott (1997) trend. To construct the real-time output gap data, we estimate for each quarter both a quadratic and a Hodrick-Prescott trend using real-time output data available in that 6 The driving forces in this economy are the the additive disturbances " t and the multiplicative shocks modeled through the modes j t : Diferently from multiplicative shocks, the presence of additive disturbances does not have any e¤ect on the optimal monetary policy due to certainty equivalence. Nonetheless, in the New-Keynesian model where variables denote log-deviations from steady state values, the role of additive disturbances is to allow the economy departing from the steady state equilibrium.
7 Details of the application of the Svensson and Williams approach are reported in Appendix B.
quarter. The output gap for the quarter is the end-of-sample residual from that quadratic trend and Hodrick-Prescott (HP) trend regressions, respectively. This means, for example, that in constructing the output gap data for the period 1969Q4 to 2009Q2 (159 quarters), we re-estimated 159 regressions 8 . To tackle the end-point problem in calculating the HP trend (see Mise et al, 2005a,b) , we applied an autoregressive AR(n) model (with n set at 4 to eliminate serial correlation) to each of the real-time and …n a l -t i m e output measures. The AR model was used to forecast six additional quarters that were then added to each of the series before applying the HP …l t e r . Figure  1 plots the federal funds rate and the di¤erent measures of in ‡ation and the output gap. The federal funds rate is higher during the 1970s and early 1980s and reaches its lowest level following the 2007-2009 …n a n c i a l crisis. In ‡ation is higher during the 1970s and early 1980s; it also rises towards the end of our sample. Compared to the other output gap measures, real-time output detrended by a quadratic trend …l t e r suggests a more severe downturn in the mid-1970s and following the 2007-2009 …n a n c i a l crisis. The two HP output gap measures move very much in line with each other (these have a correlation of 0.88). Empirical estimates using these two measures produced qualitatively similar results. In what follows, and in order to save space, we only report estimates using the real-time HP output gap measure (results based on the …n a l -t i m e HP output gap measure are available on request).
Equations (1), (2) and (3) are estimated jointly using the continuously updated Generalized Methods of Moments (GMM) estimator of Hansen et al (1996) with a constant, four lags of the interest rate, four lags of in ‡ation and four lags of the output gap as instruments for all three equations. Column (i) of Table 1 reports real-time estimates with output detrended by a quadratic trend and with SPF in ‡ation forecasts; column (ii) reports real-time estimates with output detrended by a Hodrick-Prescott trend and with SPF in ‡ation forecasts, and column (iii) reports …n a l estimates with output detrended by the CBO measure of potential output and with in ‡ation forecasts replaced by actual in ‡ation values. We also report the system's J statistic which tests the validity of the instruments used (Hansen, 1982) . We estimate that the weight on in ‡ation ranges from 1.53 to 2.12; the weight on the output gap ranges from 1.07 to 1.56 and the persistence parameter ranges from 0.83 to 0.90. Our estimates indicate a more aggressive response of policymakers to in ‡ation and the output gap using real-time as opposed to …n a l data. Numbers in parentheses are the standard errors of the estimates. J stat is the p-value of a chi-square test of the system's overidentifying restrictions (Hansen, 1982) . The instruments are a constant, four lags of the interest rate, inflation and the output gap.
The in ‡ation estimates are in line with other results in the literature (e.g. Judd and Rudebusch, 1998 , Clarida et al, 2000 , Castelnuovo, 2003 , Alcidi et al. 2009 , and Martin and Milas, 2009 ) and satisfy the Taylor (1993) principle that excessive in ‡ation should trigger increases in the real interest rate 9 . Our estimates suggest that the weight on past output in the aggregate demand equation ranges between 0.51 and 0.54 whereas the weight on past in ‡ation in the aggregate supply equation ranges between 0.51 and 0.91. The estimates of the AS imply that backward looking in ‡ation e¤ects are more important than forward looking ones. This is in line with Rudd and Whelan (2005) and Linde (2005) but contradicts e.g. Gali and Gertler (1999) , Gali et al (2005) and Kim and Kim (2008) . The model with …n a l data …t s monetary policy and the AD and AS equations best as it delivers the lowest regression standard error and the highest adjusted R2. This …n d i n g is consistent with other evidence that policymakers do not respond to real-time output data, for example in the context of …s c a l policy (see for example IMF, 2008, chapter 5). One interpretation of this …n d i n g is that estimates of policy rules based on …n a l data may be misleading since they assume a policy response to data policymakers did not possess at the time (e.g. Orphanides and van Norden, 2005 ). An alternative interpretation is that policymakers do not in fact place that much weight on real-time data, which according to Adam and Cobham (2004) , does not correspond "precisely to what researchers would like -the output gap as understood at the time by policymakers -which seems nearly impossible to identify".
Finally, it is worth making the following points. First, since the system is estimated jointly, the performance of the di¤erent variants of the policy rule depends on the …t of the other equations in the model. Second, and perhaps more importantly, the …t of the estimated equations is contingent on having allowed for the smoothing interest rate coe¢ cient to vary between the di¤erent speci…cations in Table 1 . Third, due to endpoint problems with the HP …l t e r , speci…cation (i) is much more trustworthy than speci…cation (ii). However, as mentioned above, we have tried to hedge against this problem by extending the GDP series using the AR forecasts before applying the HP …l t e r .
Optimal monetary policy response to output gap and in ‡ation uncertainty
This section starts by presenting the theoretical predictions of the model considering the separate and joint impact of the exogenous level of in ‡ation and output gap volatility on the optimal monetary policy. It then tests the model empirically using US data.
Theoretical predictions of the model
We choose the parameter values for the AD and AS equations based on the …n a l -t i m e estimates reported in column (iii) of Table 1 (which …t the data best). We then compute the optimal monetary policy response to changes in the volatility of the in ‡ation and output gap processes under the assumption, common in the literature, that the central bank pursues ‡e x i b l e in ‡ation targeting and wishes to smooth the interest rate path (that is, = 1, = 0:1 and = 0:2) 10 . In our model the vector of state variables is given by X t = t ; t+1jt ; y t ; i t 1 ) 0 so that due to the Markov Jump-Linear-Quadratic setup, the optimal monetary policy, for a given value of multiplicative uncertainty, is a linear function of X t 11 : Since the optimal coe¢ cient for current in ‡ation, t ; is always zero, the optimal policy turns out to depend only on t+1jt ; y t ; i t 1 as anticipated in (6): Furthermore, in order to allow comparisons of the coe¢ cient for in ‡ation and output-gap with much of the earlier literature, we present the results of the analysis in terms of the long-run optimal monetary policy i t = t+1jt + y y t ; and discuss separately at the end of section 4.1.1. the relation between uncertainty and the optimal policy response to the lagged interest rate 12 . Figure 2 reports the coe¢ cients of the optimal monetary policy for increasing values of the standard deviations of y jt and jt , i.e. y and . The range of the standard deviations has been chosen in order to obtain a realistic mea-sure of the volatility for the output and in ‡ation one-period ahead forecast errors. As to the former, we assumed that the upper bound of the standard deviation of the shock to the output gap is 0.4. It follows that, in any period t, due to the presence of uncertainty captured by the factor y jt , actual output gap may di¤er from the one-period ahead forecast of, at the most, 56 percentage points of its value 13 . For example, if the expected value of the output gap based on the period t information set is 1%, then its actual value in period t + 1 may shift at the most to 0.44% or 1.56%. This range is in line with the low reliability of output gap estimates in real-time discussed for example by Orphanides and van Norden (2002) who …n d that ex-post revisions of the real-time output gap estimates can be of the same order of magnitude as the output gap itself. Turning to in ‡ation, we let 2 [0; 0:175] so that in any period t actual in ‡ation may di¤er from the one-period ahead forecast of, at the most, 25 percentage points of its value. This level of the variability of in ‡ation is consistent with the view that forecasting errors related to in ‡ation estimates tend to be less than half the ones related to output gap estimates 14 . Describing our …n d i n g s , …r s t Figure 2 (a, b) shows that the optimal response to a state variable increases in the level of exogenous volatility surrounding that variable. Since the admissible range of output gap volatility is more than two times as large as the one of in ‡ation volatility, this increase is remarkably large for the optimal response to the output gap in presence of output gap volatility.
To gain the intuition for this result it is useful to recall that relaxing the certainty equivalence assumption the central bank objective is to have the distribution forecasts of in ‡ation and the output gap that "look good". In this model, the quality of the distribution forecasts, measured for instance by their volatility, is negatively a¤ected by two factors: the perceived exogenous volatility in the in ‡ation and output gap processes and the distance of the economy from its long-run equilibrium. While the role played by the former is evident, to see the role played by the latter consider that due to the multiplicative nature of the shock capturing the exogenous volatility in the in ‡ation and output gap processes, the further away is the economy from the long-run equilibrium, the larger is the impact of the shock for a given level of its volatility. Now, when there is an exogenous increase in the volatility of the shocks, the length of the potential deviations of the economy from its steady state increases and may combine with the second factor in a self-enforcing cycle 13 Given the uniform distribution for that quickly deteriorates the distribution forecasts. To take this contingency into account monetary policy needs to move preemptively. It thus gets more reactive in presence of an increase in the volatility of the in ‡ation and output gap.
Figure 2 also shows that the optimal response to in ‡ation is inversely related to output gap volatility, whereas the optimal response to the output gap tends to be unrelated to in ‡ation volatility; see panels (a) and (b) respectively. This symmetry breaking occurs as output gap volatility introduces a trade-o¤ between the quality of the distribution forecasts for in ‡ation and the output gap. In contrast, the presence of in ‡ation volatility does not introduce a similar trade-o¤. To see the mechanism at work, let us consider the behavior of the central bank in two di¤erent scenarios. In the …r s t one, in ‡ation deviates from its long-run value, i.e. 6 = 0; in presence of output gap volatility; in the second one, the output gap deviates from its long-run value, i.e. y 6 = 0; in presence of in ‡ation volatility. In the …r s t case, the policymakers'attempt to stabilize in ‡ation requires a deviation of the output gap from its long-run value. This implies a loss for the central bank. However, the presence of output gap volatility now adds a further loss as it makes it potentially harder to take the output gap back to the equilibrium in the subsequent periods. Thus, policymakers will trade-o¤ slower in ‡ation stabilization for smaller deterioration of the output gap distribution forecast. This gets re ‡ected in an attenuation of the policy response to in ‡ation. Conversely, when the output gap deviates from its long-run value and the central bank faces in ‡ation uncertainty, the attempt to stabilize the output gap will not require a deviation of in ‡ation from its long-run value. On the contrary, by stabilizing the output gap, policymakers prevent output gap deviations from perturbing in ‡ation via the Phillips curve. This explains why the policy response to the output gap is not a¤ected by in ‡ation uncertainty.
The result that accounting for uncertainty can lead to a more aggressive policy has precedents in the literature. Söderström (2002) , with a backwardlooking model found that the policy responsiveness to in ‡ation increases with the uncertainty on the persistence of this variable. Extending the analysis with a microfounded forward-looking model where policymakers minimize a social welfare loss, Kimura and Kurozumi (2007) con…rmed this result. The current paper, abstracting from speci…c sources of uncertainty considered in previous contributions, suggests that a more aggressive policy response to a state variable should occur when the exogenous overall volatility surrounding that variable increases. It is worth noting that, in real-time, information on changes in speci…c sources of uncertainty seems more di¢ cult to gather than general information on variations in the uncertainty of the output gap and in ‡ation processes. Thus, the previous result matters for policy design in that it unveils the utility of limited information on the general uncertainty in the output gap and in ‡ation processes when central banks cannot rely on detailed information on the uncertainty sources.
We also note that a distinct implication of the paper's multiplicative set-up is that the forecasting precision is negatively correlated with the size of the output gap and the level of in ‡ation as implied by the multiplicative speci…c a t i o n of the IS equation and the New Keynesian Phillips Curve. In other words, the further the economy departs from the steady state, the more di¢ -cult it becomes to forecast the evolution of the economy. One practical way of assessing this is to compare, for instance, the Bank of England's fan chart for GDP growth in the pre-crisis In ‡ation Report of February 2007 with that at the height of the recession in the In ‡ation Report of August 2009 (both reports are available from the website of the Bank of England). The former forecasts GDP growth in the (0.75%, 4.75%) range whereas the latter forecasts a much wider GDP growth range of (-1%, 5.5%). This highlights the di¢ culty in forecasting the further away the economy moves from equilibrium.
Optimal policy responses with both in ‡ation and output gap volatility
So far we have considered the case in which the exogenous volatility surrounding one process (either the output gap or in ‡ation) increases as the volatility surrounding the other process is constant. While investigating this scenario has been instructive to see the speci…c contributions of and y on the optimal policy, a more realistic one occurs when both processes are surrounded by exogenous uncertainty and, in real-time, policymakers perceive shifts in the volatility of one process relative to the volatility of the other process.
To study this case, we introduce an output gap relative volatility ratio and investigate how the optimal policy reacts to changes in this ratio. We de…ne the output gap relative volatility ratio as y = ( y + ) and impose the following inverse relation between y and y = y y ; where y = 0:4 and = 0:175 refer to the upper bound for the volatility of the output gap and in ‡ation processes, respectively. Thus It is worth noting that the ratio is equal to zero if and only if there is maximum volatility in the in ‡ation processes and no volatility in the output gap process; on the other hand, it is equal to one if and only if there is maximum volatility in the output gap process and no volatility in the in ‡ation process, that is
We also note that the level of overrall exogenous volatility, y + ; associated with the relative output gap volatility is comparable to the cases analyzed in the previous section where either exogenous output gap volatility or in ‡ation volatility was considered. In particular, the overall exogenous volatility is at least (at most) equal to the maximum volatility that we had with only exogenous in ‡ation (output-gap) volatility, that is y + 2 [0:175; 0:4] : Figure 3 plots the optimal policy coe¢ cients for the output gap and in ‡a-tion versus the output gap relative volatility ratio. Figure 3 shows that when the volatility in the output gap is inversely related to the volatility in in ‡ation, movements in the volatilities of y and should be associated with changes in the same direction of the policy response to these variables. Furthermore, by equally splitting the y and volatility ranges we notice that with more volatility in the in ‡ation process than the output gap process (region A), the optimal monetary policy tends to react more to in ‡ation than to the output gap in a fashion similar to what predicted by the Taylor rule. Instead, in the opposite case (region B), the policy response to the output gap exceeds the one to in ‡ation. Finally, in region B, the spread between the policy responses is remarkably larger than in region A and the response to the less volatile state variable tends to become negligible, while it remains important in region A. This latter response is in line with the breaking symmetry e¤ect previously described, which is caused by the di¤erent impact of the y and volatility on the optimal policy. Summing up, these …n d i n g s show that also in the more realistic case in which policymakers face uncertainty in both processes, there is (i) a positive relation between the volatility of a state variable and reactiveness of the associated policy response, and (ii) an asymmetric policy behavior associated with movements in the relative volatility.
It is important to note that the results presented in section 4.1. and 4.1.1 show the optimal long-run policy response to in ‡ation and the output gap taking implicitly into consideration the role played by the optimal response to the lagged interest rate, i.e the degree of optimal policy inertia. When we focus on the short-run optimal policy, which reveals optimal coe¢ cients for t+1jt ; y t ; i t 1 ; we have the coe¢ cient for i t 1 falling monotonically for increasing values of y and the same qualitative behavior for the response to t+1jt ; y t . Thus with only output-gap uncertainty, or more output gap uncertainty relative to in ‡ation uncertainty, monetary policy becomes less inertial. Since in these two cases the optimal response to the output gap gets larger than the response to in ‡ation, less inertia turns out to amplify more the response to the output gap than the response to in ‡ation. This explains why the di¤erence in these responses is larger in presence of output gap uncertainty 15 .
Empirical application on US monetary policy
The theoretical predictions reported in Figure 3 are now tested on US monetary policy over the 1969Q4-2009Q2 period. We construct the volatility measures yt , t , and the relative volatility ratio y y+ t , respectively, by taking the 8-quarter moving standard deviation of in ‡ation and the output gap (results using a 16-quarter moving standard deviation are qualitatively similar). Our measures of volatility are reported in Figure 4 . In ‡ation volatility is greatest in the 1970s, and towards the end of our sample. Output gap volatility declines throughout the 1980s with resurgences in the early 1990s, after the 9/11 terrorist attacks, and following the …n a n c i a l crisis at the end of our sample. We have also considered as measures of shock uncertainty the Root Mean Square Errors for output and in ‡ation instead; empirical results based on these very measure were poor compared to the ones reported below. To allow for asymmetric volatility e¤ects, we express the monetary policy rule as: To allow for multiplicative uncertainty e¤ects, the model in (7) is estimated jointly with the AD-AS equations (1) and (2) where the crossproduct shocks y and are proxied by y and , respectively. To save space, we only report estimates of (7) in Table 2 (estimates of (1-2) are very similar to those reported in Table 1 and are available on request). We estimate that + y;1 > 0, + ;1 < 0, y;1 < 0, and ;1 > 0. These estimates are statistically signi…cant, suggesting that higher (lower) relative volatility in the output gap process raises (lowers) the response of monetary policy to the output gap and lowers (raises) the response to in ‡ation. All three models estimated in columns (i)-(iii) of Table 2 …t the data better than the corresponding models in Table 1 . Therefore, both in ‡ation and output gap volatility matter for US monetary policy. Amongst all estimated models, the model with …n a l data (reported in column (iii) of Table 2 ) delivers the best …t . For this model, the average output gap response drops from 1.61 when there is higher relative volatility in the output gap to 1.48 when there is higher relative volatility in in ‡ation. On the other hand, the average in ‡ation response increases from 1.49 when there is higher relative volatility in the output gap to 1.56 when there is higher relative volatility in in ‡ation. Consistent with Figure 3 , the average output gap response is higher (lower) than the average in ‡ation response when there is higher (lower) relative volatility in the output gap process. These average estimates provide some evidence of asymmetries in the response to in ‡ation and the output gap when volatility is considered.
Estimates of the real-time models (in columns (i) and (ii) of Table 2 ) also suggest that the average in ‡ation response increases when there is higher relative volatility in in ‡ation. On the other hand, the output gap response increases when there is higher relative output gap volatility for the model in column (i) but not for the one in column (ii); the latter …n d i n g is arguably due to the + y;0 coe¢ cient being imprecisely estimated. To …x ideas, we discuss the implications of equation (7) for optimal monetary policy in the U.S. using the estimates in column (i) of Table 2 . First, consider the case where the U.S. economy experiences a Japanese style de ‡a-tion with low in ‡ation as well as low in ‡ation volatility in one period followed by an even lower in ‡ation volatility in the next period (such that the relative in ‡ation volatility ratio drops). In this case, the average response of policymakers to in ‡ation is equal to 1.88, whereas the average response to the output gap is equal to 0.90. Contrast the above responses with the case where the U.S. economy experiences a 1970s style increase in in ‡ation volatility, with in ‡ation volatility in one period followed by an even higher in ‡ation volatility in the next period (such that the relative in ‡ation volatility ratio rises). In this case, policymakers become more concerned with in ‡ation and less concerned with output gap ‡u c t u a t i o n s , as the average response to in ‡ation rises from 1.88 to 2.12, whereas the average response to the output gap drops from 0.90 to 0.85.
We have also estimated alternative volatility measures based on the structural shocks derived from a Vector Autoregressive (VAR) system with six lags (chosen by the Akaike Information Criterion) in output gap, in ‡ation and the interest rate. Using the above ordering, we have identi…ed the structural output gap, in ‡ation and interest rate shocks using the Cholesky decomposition (for more details of the structural VA R approach see e.g. Amisano and Giannini, 1997) . As an alternative, we have augmented the VA R with commodity price in ‡ation (based on the spot price index of all commodities from the Commodity Research Bureau) as an additional variable. 5 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 Output gap (output detrended by CBO potential output) uncertainty Inflation uncertainty Relative output gap uncertainty ratio 8 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 Output gap (output dtrended by quadratic trend) uncertainty Inflation uncertainty Relative output gap uncertainty ratio Notes: All models include an intercept term; estimates of this are not reported. Numbers in parentheses are the standard errors of the estimates. J stat is the p-values of a chi-square test of the system's overidentifying restrictions (Hansen, 1982) . The instruments are a constant, four lags of the interest rate, inflation and the output gap and one lag of inflation uncertainty and output gap uncertainty. This is routinely added to the VA R in order to limit the "price puzzle", that is, the positive response of prices to interest rate increases (see e.g. Boivin and Giannonni, 2006 and references therein). Doing so makes no qualitative di¤erence to what follows. Figure 4d ) plots our uncertainty measures based on the 8-quarter moving standard deviation of the VA R -d e r i ve d structural shocks for in ‡ation and the real-time output gap (the latter is detrended by quadratic trend; empirical results based on the CBO measure of potential output and a HP trend …l t e r were poor and for this reason not reported). In line with our previous results, the estimates reported in column (iv) of Table  2 suggest that (i) the average in ‡ation response increases when there is higher relative volatility in in ‡ation and (ii) the output gap response increases when there is higher relative output gap volatility; however, the + y;1 coe¢ cient is imprecisely estimated and the model …t s the data worse than the model which uses …n a l data in column (iii) of Table 2 . All in all, our estimates provide some evidence of asymmetries in the response to in ‡ation and the output gap when uncertainty is considered.
Robustness analysis
At this point, some natural questions inspire a battery of experiments to check for the robustness of our results 16 . We …r s t consider to what extent, if any, changes in the central bank preferences may a¤ect these results. This question matters in that policymakers'preferences are not known with certainty and might also change due to special facts or contingencies. Thus we consider the case where output gap stabilization is as important as in ‡ation stabilization 17 . The result of this experiment is reported in Figure 5 and shows that policymakers' preferences do not a¤ect the monotonicity or the curvature type of the paths; they only a¤ect the degree of concavity or convexity of these paths.
We then ask what happens to the case where the multiplicative shocks exhibit some persistence. Arguably, this could be due to some exogenous disturbance and/or change in the structure of the economy whose medium or long-lived nature is not known yet by the policymakers. To address this question, we introduce some inertia into the Markov chain. Thus, a new Markov matrix, P , is constructed such that: (i) the probability that the shock keeps the same value over two periods is equal to 0.5, (ii) the probability that the shock jumps to adjacent values is equal to 0.3, and (iii) by skipping the adjacent values, the probability that the shock jumps to the closer remaining values is equal to 0.1. Therefore, P takes the form P = Finally, we consider to what extent, if any, the realistic policy transmission lags embedded in the model a¤ect the relation between in ‡ation and output gap uncertainty and optimal policy. We then relax the assumption of a oneperiod lag between policy action and output gap response and of a further one-period lag between output gap and in ‡ation changes. Accordingly, the AD and AS take the more conventional form
and the vector of state variable is now given by X t = ( t ; y t ; i 
Conclusions
This paper investigates optimal real-time monetary policy when policymakers consider the presence of undistinguishable uncertainty about the state and structure of the economy proxied by the exogenous volatility of the in ‡ation and output gap processes. First, the paper shows that in presence of undistinguishable uncertainty either on in ‡ation or the output gap, considering this uncertainty in the policy decisions results in a more aggressive response to the uncertain state variable. Furthermore, the optimal response to in ‡ation is inversely related to output gap uncertainty while the optimal response to the output gap tends to be unrelated to in ‡ation uncertainty.
Second, in presence of exogenous uncertainty in both the in ‡ation and output gap processes, when there is relatively more uncertainty on in ‡ation than on the output gap, optimal monetary policy resembles the Taylor rule. On the other hand, when the uncertainty on the output gap exceeds the one on in ‡ation, optimal monetary policy tends to respond more strongly to the output gap and to ignore in ‡ation. Finally, in intermediate cases, the policy response to the state variables tends to be similar.
These results are based on a preemptive behavior of the central bank aiming to reduce the risk of large deviations of the economy from its long-run equilibrium, which would deteriorate the distribution forecasts for in ‡ation and the output gap. In an empirical test carried out on the US economy, we …n d that the model predictions tend to be consistent with the data.
The model discussed in the current paper can be extended to allow for the e¤ects of other types of uncertainty such as exchange rate uncertainty. We intend to address these issues in future research.
A Details on microfoundations A.1 Preferences and technology
The economy features a continuum of unit mass of identical households, each producing a di¤erent variety of a consumption good indexed by j. For the sake of simplicity, but without loss of generality, we assume preferences only on consumption, see for example Svensson (2000) . To obtain realistic inertia in the household behavior we introduce habits persistence following Abel (1990) so that the household's utility function is
where denotes the intertemporal discount factor, C t consumption of consumer/producer j, which is a composite good given by the Dixit-Stiglitz aggregator of the continuum of varieties of the consumption good
with # > 1 denoting the elasticity of substitution among any two di¤erenti-ated varieties; …n a l l y, e C t is aggregate consumption, and and denote the degree of habits persistence in consumption and the intertemporal elasticity of substitution respectively.
As in Flamini (2007) we assume that the composite good used for consumption is also used for production and let Y P t (j) be the quantity of the composite good used by …r m j to produce its own di¤erentiated variety Y t (j) with the production function
where f is an increasing, concave, isoelastic function. It follows that the input requirement function for any …r m j is given by
where V f 1 ; so that the …r m 's variable costs are given by
where
is the price of the composite good, and the …r m 's marginal costs are
A.2 Steady state
Assuming ‡e x i b l e prices, the monopolistic competitive representative …r m j sets the optimal price p t (j) in any period as a markup on marginal costs,
where >1 is the desired markup. Considering the preferences of the household, the demand function for each variety j is
and substituting (11) into (12) yields
Now, following Wo o dford (2003, ch. 3), we notice that the RHS of (13) is increasing in Y t (j) so that there is a unique Y t (j) that solves this equation given Y t : Thus in equilibrium each …r m will supply the same quantity which must equal Y t : As a result the steady state level of output, Y; is the solution to
Since all the …r m s use the same technology, it also follows that Y
and using the market clearing condition
we …n a l l y obtain that in steady state
A.3 Aggregate demand
We can now log-linearize (15) around steady state values obtaining 
where the is the output elasticity the input requirement function (14). Factorizing y yields y t = ' 1 (1 ') c t ;
and assuming for sake of simplicity but without loss of generality that a percentage increase of the quantity produced requires the same percentage in-crease of the input, that is = 1; we obtain
In order to reproduce a realistic one-period lag in the transmission of policy action to real activity, we assume as in Rotemberg and Wo o dford (1997) and Boivin and Giannoni (2006) that consumption decisions are predetermined one period in advance, speci…cally we let households choose the index C t at date t 1: Thus, preferences maximization subject to a budget constraint and a no-Ponzi condition leads to the following log-linearised Euler equation
where for sake of simplicity and without signi…cant loss in generality we have approximated r t+1jt with r t : Finally, considering (17), equation (18) can be rewritten in terms of the output gap as
A.4 Derivation of the aggregate supply
In order to have a realistic two-period lag in the transmission of monetary policy to in ‡ation we follow Rotemberg and Wo o dford (1997) and Boivin and Giannoni (2006) assuming that pricing decisions are made two periods in advance. We also assume the Calvo (1983) staggered price scheme and follow Christiano and al. (2005) in allowing the …r m s that cannot up-date the price optimally to index their price to previous in ‡ation. Thus, …r m j pro…t maximization problem is
where (1 ) is the probability that in any period the producer choose an optimal price, t+ +1
; with denoting the degree of indexation to previous period in ‡ation when it is not possible to optimally up-date the price, and …n a l l y t and e P t+2 denote the marginal utility of consumption, and the new price chosen in period t for period t + 2, respectively. The …r s t -o r d e r condition is
; which can be rewritten as
where X t+2 e P t+2 P t+2
and t+2
In equilibrium any …r m that is free to choose the price in period t will choose the same price, e P t ; and the remaining …r m s that are not free to choose the price in period t will keep the previous period price updated to the previous period in ‡ation. Thus, the aggregate price is given by
Then we log-linearize the …r s t order condition around the steady state. Let us allow bounded ‡u c t u a t i o n s in ( t ; X t ; t ; Y t ) around the steady state ( ; 1; 1; Y; ) and let small letters be log-deviations from their steady state value. Then we obtain
where ! > 0 is the elasticity of V 0 with respect to Y t (j) : Then, log-linearizing (19) yields
which can be rewritten as
Then, equation (22) can be rewritten as
Next, approximating by unit in order to ensure the Natural-rate hypothesis and combining the previous equation with (21) we obtain
Finally, adding the error term " t+2 + 1+ " t+1 to both sides of the previous equation yields
B Key elements of the Svensson and Williams approach
We …r s t expand the product of the multiplicative shocks with the terms in the square brackets of the RHS in (1-2) and then rewrite the aggregate demand and supply in State-space form as
where X t and x t are, respectively, the vectors of predetermined and forward looking variables X t = t ; t+1jt ; y t ; i t 1 0 ;
x t = y t+1jt ; t+2jt 0 ;
" t is the vector of additive exogenous disturbances, and …n a l l y the matrices A 11j t+1 ; A 12j t+1 ; B 1j t+1 ; A 21jt ; A 22jt ; B 2jt ;
are random, each free to take n j di¤erent values in period t corresponding to the n j modes indexed by j t 2 f1; 2; :::; ng :
Turning to the central bank loss function (3), it can be rewritten as
where the period loss function can be expressed in matrix form as
and W is a positive semide…nite matrix depending on the central bank preferences. Thus the central bank problem consists of minimizing (26) subject to (23-24) and (5). Following the approach described in Svensson and Williams (2007a) , this problem, which is not recursive due to the presence of forward looking variables, needs to be converted to a recursive one. The approach consists in expanding appropriately the state and control space to use the recursive saddlepoint method developed by Marcet and Marimon (1998) . Speci…cally, the vector of lagged Lagrange multipliers, which will be denoted by t 1 ; corresponding to the forward-looking equations is added as a vector of additional state variables. Furthermore, the vector of current values of these multipliers, which will be denoted by t ; as well as the expected values of the forward looking variables themselves, which will be denoted by z t ; are added as vectors of additional control variables. Accordingly, equation (24) is replaced by two equivalent equations E t x t+1 = z t ; 0 = A 21jt X t + A 22jt x t z t + B 2jt i t ;
where z t is a vector of additional forward-looking variables. Then solving the second equation for x t we obtain x t = x (X t ; z t ; i t ; j t ) ; e which is a convenient representation of the forward-looking variables in the application of the Marcet and Marimon method. This method requires to introduce the dual period loss function L e e X t ; z t ; i t ; t ; j t L (X t ; i t ) 0 t z t + 0 t 1 1 e x (X t ; z t ; i t ; j t )
and …n d a saddlepoint for the dual intertemporal loss function
e L e X t ; z t ; i t ; t ; j t such that the dual intertemporal loss function is maximized over f t+ g 0 and minimized over fz t+ ; i t+ g 0 subject to (23-24) and (5).
To solve this problem, we let s t e X 
subject to the law of motion of the perceived state of the economy X t+1 = A 11j t+1 X t + A 12j t+1 e x (X t ; z t ; i t ; j t ) + B 1j t+1 i t + " t+1 t = t p t+ = P 0 p t :
Next notice that if modes were …x e d we would have a standard Linear Quadratic problem whose the familiar solution is a quadratic value function and a linear policy. In the current model, since the belief evolution is exogenous, the value function is then quadratic in X t for a given belief, that is for a given e perceived probability distribution p t : In other words the value function is beliefdependent quadratic which implies that the optimal policy is belief-dependent linear, speci…cally a linear function of the expanded state e X t for a given p t : Now the fact that the value function is quadratic in X t for a given p t ; e matters in that it can be expressed in a matrix form. Furthermore, accounting for (26), the dual period loss function (27) can be also written in matrix form in terms of the expanded vector of predetermined variables e X t and the expanded vector of control variables, i.e. e i t (z 0 t ; i t ; 0 t ) 0 : This allows writing the value function for the dual problem (28) and the Bellman equation (29) in matrix form. Then it is possible to obtain a …r s t order condition with respect to e i t which allows determining the following form of the policy function
where e F (p t ) is a matrix depending on the perceived distribution of the modes in period t: It is worth noting that the matrix e F (p t ) is unknown as it depends on the value function matrix which is unknown too at this stage. Then, equation (31) is embedded in the Bellman equation in matrix form leading to the so called Riccati equation. The latter is …n a l l y used in the algorithm developed by Svensson and Williams to determine the unknown value function matrix and the matrix e F (p t ) through numerical iterations.
